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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~IEl\IBERS OF THE UTAH STATE 
l\[OTEL ASSOCIATION, through 
RALPH D. HOWE, their President, 
Plailntiff s, 
THEv~.TATE OF UTAH, through its \ 
TAX COMMISSION, consisting of 
ORVILLE GUNTHER, Chairman; 
ALLAN M. LIPMAN, ARIAS G. 
BELNAP, and HERBERT F. 
SMART, 
Defendants. 
Case 
No. 9201 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent substantially agrees with the statement 
of facts, as stated by the appellants and recognize that 
this action was initiated by the plaintiffs for the pur-
pose of contesting the constitutionality of subsection (f) 
of Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amend-
ed. This Section of the Sales Tax Act was passed by the 
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1959 session of the State Legislature and provides as 
follows: 
''From and after the effective date of this Act 
there is levied and there shall be collected and 
paid: ... 
(f) A tax equivalent to 2% of the amount paid or 
charged for tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer 
court accommodations and services, provided that 
this subsection shall not apply to the amount paid 
or charged for tourist home, motel, hotel or trailer 
court where residency is maintained continuously 
under the terms of a lease or similar agreement 
for a period of not less than thirty days.'' 
The action was initiated in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, where it was contended that the above sub-
section V\7as in violation of the 14th amndment of the Con-
stitution of the United States and Article I, Section 24 
of the Constitution of Utah, in that it was discrimina-
tory and denied plaintiffs equal protection under the 
laws. 
In response to plaintiffs' complaint, the State Tax 
Commission made a motion to dismiss, setting forth nine 
separate grounds (R-4), one of which " .,.as, that the plain-
tiffs' complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. The trial court requested briefs on 
this one point only, and later, in a memorandum decision 
(R-21), properly dismissed the action on this point. Al-
though respondent feels that there 'vas merit in the other 
eight grounds alleged for dismissal of said case, in the 
interest of bringing said matter to a conclusion and hav-
ing the case decided on its merits, it is the Tax Com-
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mission's desi rt' to ha \~e said case decided upon the 
grounds for dismissal applied by the District Court in 
making its decision. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
APPELLANTS HAVE NOT CORRECTLY INTER-
PRETED THE MEANING OF SECTION 59-15-4 (f), 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
PoiNT II. 
THE CLASSIFICATION PROVIDED FOR IN SUB-
SECTION (f) OF SECTION 59-15-4 IS NOT DISCRIMI-
NATORY OR UNREASONABLE. 
PoiNT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT BEFORE HEARING EVIDENCE REGARD-
ING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE CLASSI-
FICATION. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
APPELLANTS HAVE NOT CORRECTLY INTER-
PRETED THE MEANING OF SECTION 59-15-4 (f), 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
Appellants have contended in Point II of their brief 
that Section 59-15-4 (f) is unconstitutional because it 
does not include certain businesses of a similar nature to 
hotels, motels, tourist homes and trailer courts. Among 
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those businesses which appellants claim to be excluded 
are apartment houses, guest houses, dude ranches, resorts 
and rooming houses. 
It would follow from appellant's highly restrictive 
interpretation that the requirement of collecting said 
sales tax is to be determined by the name a business gives 
itself. Thus, if a business which for a long time has oper-
ated as a motel were to call itself an apartment house or 
guest house, but continued to provide the same services 
as before, then, such business would not be required to 
collect the tax. 
We do not believe their interpretation to be correct 
or substantiated in the law. It is completely unreason-
able, contrary to the regulations of the Tax Commission, 
contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and con-
trary to the intention of the Legislature. 
Let us examine the statute: 
(f) A tax equivalent to 2% of the amount paid or 
charged for tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer 
court accommoda.tions and services . . . (emphasis 
added) 
It is apparent from the italicized words that the Leg-
islature intended to place the tax on a certain class of 
accommodations and services. The reference in connec-
tion therewith to hotels, motels and tourist homes '""as 
not meant to restrict the tax to them as such, but "'"as a 
designation of a type of services and accommodations 
to be subjected to the tax. The fact that these services 
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may be afforded by someone not specifically designating 
itself as a hotel, motel, or a tourist home, would not 
alter any responsibility to collect the tax. If in fact an 
apartment or dude ranch were to offer hotel or motel 
accommodations, then such transactions would be subject 
to the tax. 
Prior to the effective date of subsection (f), the 
Tax Commission adopted Sales Tax Regulation No. 79, 
which reads as follows : 
''TouRIST HoME, HoTEL, MoTEL OR TRAILER CouRT 
AccoMMODATIONs AND SERVIcEs DEFINED. The 
terms, tourist home, hotel and motel means any 
place that is known to the public as having rooms, 
apartments or units to rent, either by the day, 
week, or month. The term trailer court means any 
place that is known to the public as having house 
trailers or space to park a house trailer for rent, 
either by the day, week or month. The terms ac-
commodations and services mean any charge made 
for the room, apartment, unit, house trailer or 
space to park a house trailer, including any 
charges made for local telephone, electricity, pro-
pane gas, or similar services. 
''The tax is imposed on ail of the above charges 
with the exception that the tax shall not apply 
where residency is maintained continuously under 
the terms of a lease or similar agreement for thirty 
days or more. For the purpose of this regulation, 
where continuous residence is maintained for 
thirty days or more, and the charge is a monthly 
rate, it will be assumed to constitute a lease or 
similar agreement (Effective July 1, 1959).'' 
It is noted that the above regulation was formulated 
in accordance with the logical interpretation of the act. 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Inasmuch as the Legislature did not see :fit to define 
the words, hotel, motel, and tourist home, the Tax Com-
mission adopted a regulation based upon the guidance 
given by the Legislature in said act. 
In connection with this point, we wish to refer the 
Court's attention to some of the numerous cases which 
support the proposition that acts of the Legislature are 
presumed to be constitutional unless clearly shown to be 
otherwise. To cite them all would needlessly burden the 
brief with quotations familiar to the Court. The Utah 
cases of Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, P. 2d 400; 
State Water Pollution Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 
2d 247, 311 P. 2d 370; and NorL·ille v. State Tax Com-
rnission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 937, hold that "~here two 
meanings can be given an act, one constitutional and 
the other unconstitutional, the Court \Yill interpret the 
law to make it constitutional. 
Appellants have referred to situations \Yhere construc-
tion workers or others may reside temporarily in private 
homes and escape paying the tax. It may possibly be 
true, as in the administration of any tax la\Y, that there 
may be isolated instances not kno,rn to the Tax Com-
rnission 'v here the tax is not charged. It is also possible 
that appellants could scout around and find a fe\Y such 
instances; but to claim that such 'Yould make the act un-
constitutional, is like claiming the entire sales tax la"T 
is unconstitutional because a huckster parks his truck 
along the road to sell oranges and then makes it out of 
the state without reporting and paying the tax. 
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PoiNT II. 
THE CLASSIFICATION PROVIDED FOR IN SUB-
SECTION (f) OF SECTION 59-15-4 IS NOT DISCRIMI-
NATORY OR UNREASONABLE. 
Respondent agrees with the holdings in all of the 
cases cited in Point I. of appellant's brief and has no 
dispute with the recognized body of law forbidding the 
enactment of dis crimina tory, capricious, or arbitrary 
statutes. 
With respect, however, to the reasonableness of 
taxing statutes, the following statement from the case of 
Roth Drugs v. Johnson (Cal.) 57 P. 2d 1002, clearly sum-
marizes the existing law: 
''The Supreme Court of the United States has def-
initely held that the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Federal Constitution, which guarantees to all 
citizens equal protection to personal privileges 
and property rights, does not forbid reasonable 
discriminaions in matters involving taxation. 
Classifications for the purpose of taxation are rec-
ognized as necessary and valid. In making such 
classifications a sound discretion is accorded the 
Legislature; every reasonable presumption in sup-
port of the classification will be indulged in and 
if it can be reconciled on any reasonable and nat-
ural theory it will be upheld.'' 
As to the particular statute under consideration it 
is to be noted that Utah is not the only state to have 
laws imposing a sales tax upon the type of accommoda-
tions and services in question. At least eight of our 
sister states have similar statutes. 
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These states are: Washington, Section.82-04-020, Re-
vised Code of Washington ; Missouri, Section .144-020, 
Revised Statutes of Missouri; North Carolina, Section 
104-164-4, General Statutes of North Carolina; Arizona, 
Section 42.;.1314, Arizona Revised Statutes, Annotated, 
as amended· Florida Section 212-03, Florida Statutes, 
' ' ' 
1957; Tennessee, Section 67-3002, Tennessee Code Anno-
tated, as amended; Kansas, Section 79 :3603(g), Kansas 
General Statutes, Supp of 1957; and Louisiana, Section 
47:301 (14) (a), Louisiana Revised Statutes. 
An examination of the above laws seems to indicate 
that they are intended primarily to tax aecommoda.tions 
to tourists and transients. Although the tax base is 
broader in some states than in others, and the time or 
period used as a breaking point for distinguishing a resi-
dent from a tourist does in some cases differ, the wide-
spread adoption by states of such acts, points up the 
general recognition of such la,vs as a legal source of 
state revenue. 
In two of the above-named states, Florida and Ari-
zona, the constitutionality of the statutes haYe been ques-
tioned, and in both instances upheld. Appellants have 
cited these cases in their brief but respondent submits that 
a reading of the same will clearly indicate that they sup-
port the contentions of the State Tax Commission. 
In the case of Ga,ulden v. Kirk (Florida) 47 So. 2d, 
567, the Court, in answering the alleged claim of uncon-
stitutionality because of discrimination, stated at page 
567 of the Southern Reporter, as follows : 
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''Certainly it was appropriate for the Legislature 
to place the business of the landlord who rents to 
transients in a different class from that of the 
landlord who rents to permanent guests or tenants. 
These landlords may be in the same general class 
- assuredly both of them are engaged in renting 
living accommodations - but the distinction made 
between their respective businesses for the pur-
pose of taxation under the provision of this Act 
is permissible classification and is not unreason-
able, arbitrary, or unjustly discriminatory. The 
landlord who rents to transients rather than per-
manent tenants charges higher per diem prices, 
must (because of the very nature of his trade or 
enterprise) give strict daily attention and super-
vision to his business and guests and operates in 
a special, distinct class - possibly a more lucra-
tive field. It was necessary to establish some 
period of time which would mark the difference be-
tween a transient and a permanent guest. In its 
wisdom the legislature saw fit to establish six 
months' residence as the criterion. Such period of 
time constitutes a reasonable basis for the cleva.ge 
·of the two classes of tenants and this distinction 
is ample justification for the difference in classifi-
cation of the businesses engaged in by the land-
lords. Such division or classification is recog-
nized generally throughout the business world; 
indeed, in the hotel and apartment trade the differ-
ence between the business of furnishing living 
accommodations to transients and the business of 
supplying living accommodations to permanent 
guests or tenants is well known and accepted. 
Many hotels cater largely, if not exclusively, to 
so-called commercial or transient guests. More-
over, we take judicial notice of the ~act that the 
tourist business in this State is one of our greatest 
economic assets. Our winter, and for that matter 
our summer, visitors usually enjoy the famed 
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year-around climate with which we fortunate~y 
have been endowed, for less than six months In 
each year. If they remain longer, they should be 
extended the privilege of being classified as per-
manent guests or tenants and the landlord's busi-
ness thereby removed from the classification of 
furnishing living accommodations to transients. 
The six months basis of differentiation is reason-
able and does not amount to unjust or arbitrary 
discrimination.'' 
From the above case we learn that the Florida act 
has a broader base in that it includes some rentals paid 
for apartment house accommodations and that it extends 
to six months the time in which the tax applies. This 
would not be m1reasonable in view of the fact that Flor-
ida, with its mild winter climate, caters to a tourist trade 
in which the tourist remains for several months rather 
than a short period of time as is the case in the State of 
lT tah. The thirty -day period i11 Utah, in ne-w of the 
nature of our tourist trade, is just as logical and rea-
sonable as a six-month period for the State of Florida. 
It should also be noted that in Utah a motel owner 
is not required to collect tax from guests 'Yho rent on a 
monthly basis. It is generally recognized that motels in 
the State of Utah will often rent their accommodations 
for longer periods of time during the "~inter months. 
When doing so, such guests then fit into a class similar 
to those who rent apartments on a monthly basis. As to 
this class, the Legislature did not intend this sales tax. 
In the Arizona case of White v. Moore, 46 P. 2d 1077, 
the question arose as to the taxability of offiee spare, 
under the statute imposing a tax upon hotels, guest 
10 
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houses, dude ranches, and resorts, rooming houses, apart-
ment houses, automobile rental services, automobile stor-
age garages, parking lots, tourist camps, or any other 
business or occupation, charging storage fees or rents. 
It was contended that the Act would be discriminatory 
unless office space was so included. In rejecting this con-
tention the Court stated as follows: 
"A mere reading ... suggests that in selecting the 
businesses the Legislature had in mind occupa-
tions through which runs a common thread or 
purpose . . . Those supplying accommodations, 
either wholly or in part, for tourists or transients, 
such, for instance, as guest houses, dude ranches 
and resorts, hotels or tourist camps. One reading 
... finds it difficult, if not impossible to escape 
the conclusion that only businesses possessing 
these respective characteristics were intended to 
be included in these groups. 
"It must be kept in mind that a privilege tax is 
not a tax on property, but a tax on the right to 
engage in business and that the Legislature may 
impose it on any any class or classes of business 
it cares to and decline to apply it to others, its 
only limitation in this respect being that the classi-
fiication it makes must be reasonable, not arbi-
trary or discriminatory, and such that all those 
falling within the same class will be treated alike. 
We are unable to see a violation of this require-
ment in a statute imposing a tax on the gross 
income of those engaged in the business of fur-
nishing living accommodations to tourists or tran-
sients and not imposing it on the income of those 
who rent offices and storerooms. The former are 
activities or businesses of a particular type, and 
it is plain that their common characteristic, the one 
that guided the Legislature in naming them, is 
not possessed by the latter.'' 
11 
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Respondents have beei1 unable to find any cases hold-
ing. a statute similar to the one under. consideration 
unconstitutional, and no such authorities have been cited 
in appellant's brief. The weight of authority clearly 
supports the position of the Tax Commission. 
PoiNT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT-· DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT BEFORE HEARING EVIDENCE REGARD-
ING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE CLASSI-
FICATION.-
If the trial Court interpreted Section 59-14-4 (f) in 
the manner contended by the respondent to impose a tax 
upon a type of service or accommodation, rather than 
upon any specific business, then there \v-ould be no ex-
emption for competitors in the same type of business 
and thus no need for the introduction of any evidence. 
Appellants have never at any time indicated how, or 
what type of evidence could possibly help their position. 
Further the appellants never objected to the trial 
Court's hearing and ruling upon respondent's motion 
without evidence, until this appeal was taken. Both par-
ties argued the constitutional issue on its merits in the 
District Court and both parties submitted briefs on this 
issue. Appellant cannot now bring up a point which 
was never raised in the lower Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted by the Tax Commission 
that the decision of the District Court in granting the 
Defendants' motion to dismiss should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
BEN E. RAWLINGS, 
Special Assistant Attorney 
General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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